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There are many points on which I agree with Kayali Browne. I agree that value-judgments 
necessarily play a role in constructing a classification such as the DSM. I agree that people 
with different backgrounds and interests are likely to assess problems differently and that it 
would be a good idea for a more diverse body of people to have some involvement in 
revising the DSM. I agree that philosophers might usefully play a role when the DSM is 
being revised.  
Overall, though, I’m not convinced that Kayali Browne’s committee would be a good 
idea. In her vision such a committee would constitute a group of wise moral experts who 
would help make the value-judgments implicit in the DSM as well-informed as possible. 
Along with many others I’m sceptical of the idea that philosophers should be construed as 
moral experts in the sense of being particularly good at making practical moral decisions 
(see, for example, Archard 2011; Engelhardt 2002). I worry that philosophers may not 
actually be able to make all that much progress in addressing the sorts of deep moral question 
that Kayali Browne envisages being addressed (for example, how to weight the diffuse social 
harms caused by medicalisation against the benefits that particular individuals might gain 
from treatment, how to distinguish between willful wrong-doing and disordered behaviour). 
While philosophers have an important role to play in reminding people that such issues 
remain unaddressed and lurking behind the decisions that inform the DSM, I don’t think that 
a committee would be required to achieve this modest goal. I also worry that a committee of 
philosophers armed with veto-rights over proposed revisions to the DSM would strain 
relations between philosophy and psychiatry.  The risk is that the philosophers would come to 
be viewed as know-nothing busy-bodies. Some prominent psychiatrists already take such a 




Rather than Kayali Browne’s committee I shall suggest a more modest proposal.   
While Kayali Browne focusses on how hard and deep moral questions might be dealt with, I 
think the priority is to consider how tractable issues might be better addressed.  I shall 
suggest how some value-based problems with the DSM might be avoided fairly easily, and 
then consider the particular roles that philosophers might play in revising the DSM.  
Some of the value-based problems that afflict the DSM arise because the committees 
that write the DSM tend to be comprised of a certain type of person (typically, middle-aged, 
affluent, clever, white, male, doctors).  When such people write diagnostic criteria they do so 
with their implicit view of “normality” in mind. It is very easy for such people to assume, for 
example, that “normal” children will work hard at school and not get into trouble with the 
police, and that “normal” adults will drink a bit, but not too much, and be fairly independent, 
and gainfully employed. On occasion, such assumptions creep into diagnostic criteria and 
place the members of particular communities at increased risk of under- or over-diagnosis. 
Often all it takes for such criteria to be improved is for other people, with different life 
experiences and assumptions, to point out the biases that are at work. 
To illustrate, consider the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for phobia. In DSM-IV patients 
had to recognize their fears as unreasonable. In DSM-5 the fear merely has to be judged by 
the physician to be out of proportion. The change aimed to make possible the diagnosis of  
some older adults who develop intense fears, say of falling, but who perceive their fears to be 
reasonable (LeBeau et al., 2010). However, I suggest the revision was a mistake. Consider 
the case of someone who develops rational fears on the basis of information that the 
diagnosing physician lacks.  Take a scientist working on avian flu whose studies lead her to 
the conclusion that a worldwide pandemic is imminent. She comes to develop rational fears 
about sick birds. Using DSM-IV criteria she did not have a phobia, as she would not have 
considered her fears unreasonable. Using DSM-5, if a clinician (who we will suppose knows 
4 
 
nothing of these matters) judges her fear as being out of proportion, she can receive a 
diagnosis. This seems wrong. I suggest that most likely the problem here arose because the 
committee assumed that clinicians always know more than patients. This is the sort of error 
that it is easy for doctors to make, but that patients, with their rather different assumptions 
and life experiences, would be less-likely to overlook.  
I suggest that the easiest way to lessen the likelihood of such problems emerging 
would be to try to include a more diverse body of people when the DSM is being revised. In 
this case patients would likely spot an assumption that doctors might miss. In other cases 
input from other under-represented groups might be useful (for example, women, non-white 
people, poor people, young people, non-academically inclined people).  
At this point the admirable efforts that the APA made when the DSM-5 was being 
produced to make it possible for outsiders to have an input into the processes of revision 
should be noted.  When the DSM-5 was under construction a number of drafts, and a huge 
amount of background information, was made available online. Anyone who wanted to 
comment was invited to do so. This was a good initiative. Still, though, more could be done. I 
suspect that many people who might have spotted errors and oversights in the DSM-5 failed 
to contribute to the consultation process because they either believed they had nothing to 
offer, or doubted whether and how their feedback would be utilised. It might be necessary for 
individuals who likely have different assumptions and values than do the DSM committee 
members to be specifically invited to comment on draft diagnostic criteria. 
So far I have discussed how people from diverse backgrounds might help correct 
value-laden biases in the DSM. What though of the potential contribution of philosophers 
specifically? Philosophers likely have slightly different ways of looking at the world than 
psychiatrists and might spot some problems that would otherwise be overlooked. In addition, 
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I suggest that certain aspects of philosophical training might mean that philosophers are well-
equipped to play a further, important, though modest, role in proof-reading sets of diagnostic 
criteria.  
Consider that a number of problems with past editions of the DSM have arisen 
because of confusion between “ands” and “ors” in diagnostic criteria.  For example between 
DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR the diagnostic criteria for the paraphilias were changed. In DSM-
IV-T.R. many paraphilias could be diagnosed on the basis of “fantasies, urges or 
behaviours”.  This was a mistake. The criteria should have required “fantasies, urges and 
behaviours”.   In the context of the U.S. legal system the error took on added significance: 
The error implied that those who commit sex crimes could meet the diagnostic criteria for a 
paraphilia in virtue of their crime alone. And, in many States, sexually violent predator laws 
meant that offenders with a paraphilia diagnosis could be detained indefinitely (for discussion  
see Greenberg 2013, Cooper 2014). A somewhat similar confusion occurred in the DSM-IV 
criteria for PDD-NOS. Here, as a result of a misplaced “or”, diagnosis was theoretically 
possible for an individual whose sole symptom was “stereotyped behaviour, interests and 
activities” (First & Pincus, 2002).  
Philosophical training (eg in formal logic) makes the distinctions between different 
types of logical connective salient to philosophers. Philosophers rarely confuse “ands” and 
“ors”, and I think it likely that a philosophical proof-reader would pick up such problems. 
In this discussion I note that people from different backgrounds have different values, 
assumptions, life experiences and training. This makes different types of people better at 
spotting the different sorts of problem that can emerge when the DSM is revised.  With 
Kayali Browne I agree that it would be a good idea if non-psychiatrists played a role in 
revising the DSM, and think that philosophers might have special skills to offer.  I also agree 
6 
 
that decisions regarding values are important and might be more explicitly addressed. Unlike 
Kayali Browne’s proposal, however, mine aims to be modest. I don’t think a new committee 
is required. I think that some mistakes could be avoided if diverse outsiders (including a 
couple of philosophers) were asked to read through drafts of the diagnostic criteria to see if 
they could spot any problems.  
In this commentary I have focussed on how progress might be made in fixing 
tractable problems. To finish I should also make clear that I think that the work that 
philosophers do on deep and difficult moral and conceptual issues is also hugely important 
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